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Abstract
Restrictions on CO2 emissions, the nuclear phase out announced by some member 
states, high emissions from coal-fired power plants, and barriers to rapid 
development of renewable generation are factors that make the European Union (EU) 
highly dependent on natural gas. With three non-EU countries (Russia, Algeria and 
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2Norway) currently supplying more than half the gas consumed within the EU and 
with projections pointing out that by 2030 internal sources will only be able to meet 
25% of demand, EU desperately looks for means to secure new sources of gas 
supply. In this context, the Nabucco pipeline is planned to deliver gas from Caspian 
and Middle East regions to EU market. It runs across Turkey and then through 
Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary before connecting with a major gas hub in Austria. 
On paper, Nabucco project makes perfect sense, offering a new export route to EU
markets for Caspian gas producers (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan) as 
well as Iran and, in time, Iraq. The project is backed by the EU and strongly 
supported by the United States. Perhaps most importantly, Nabucco would 
completely bypass Russia. This paper addresses issues surrounding Nabucco project 
and their implications for European gas security. 
Keywords: European natural gas security; Nabucco project; energy policy
1. Introduction
One evening in 2002 in Vienna, a small group of Austrian energy executives took 
their colleagues from Turkish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Romanian gas companies 
to see an opera. The officials had spent the day sketching out a plan for a 3,300 km
pipeline that could transport up to 31 bcm of natural gas every year into EU markets. 
The opera they attended that night was called Nabucco and that is the name they 
gave their pipeline [1].
The security of natural gas supply is one of the main issues of EU energy strategy to 
be followed in the future. Natural gas, as a cleaner burning source of fossil fuel than 
3oil or coal, is now commonly believed to offer part of the solution to climate change 
and to problems associated with poor air quality. As a plentiful, economically viable 
and less polluting fuel, natural gas also makes sense for EU as a source for power 
generation. Therefore, consumption of natural gas in the EU is steadily increasing 
and it is likely to become the most significant energy source throughout the next two 
decades by moving from 533 bcm in 2008 to 753 bcm in 2030  [2]. The increase in 
consumption by households and industry will not be covered by EU production nor 
will Russia be able to feed the rising demand without re-exports from Caspian and 
Central Asia after 2015. This is partially due to Russia’s declining production in 
Yamal peninsula of West Siberia and largely due to relative advantages of 
commercializing Eastern gas at Chinese and Japanese markets. The sharp rise in 
Russia’s domestic demand is another pressure. Besides, Russia’s problems with 
Ukraine, which created interruptions of gas flow to Europe in January 2006 and 
January 2009, doubled EU energy security concerns to diversify suppliers.
The present paper provides a framework for understanding the importance of 
Nabucco project for the European gas security. Despite its significance, so far, the 
project and its repercussions for EU gas security have not been studied from an 
academic point of view and therefore current paper is expected to contribute current 
literature of energy studies in this respect. The analysis, in the following section, is 
focused on evaluation of the EU gas demand and supply balance to facilitate the
understanding of the context in which Nabucco is designed. Section 3 provides a 
brief summary of the project and historical background. This section also focuses on 
main strengths and drawbacks of the project. It also mentions its chief rival, namely
South Stream pipeline project. Next section is devoted to policies of different actors 
on Nabucco project, including EU, Russian, Turkish, Azeri, Turkmen, Iranian and 
4Hungarian policies. Section 5 not only critically analyses these policies but also 
provides some policy suggestions. Final section concludes.
2. European natural gas demand & supply balance
On a global level, natural gas resources are unequally distributed. Table 1, Table 2 
and Table 3 show top 20 countries with the largest proved gas reserves, production 
and consumption, respectively, in2008 [3].
[Table 1 goes here]
[Table 2 goes here]
[Table 3 goes here]
As can be seen in Table 1, the largest gas reserves are located in the Russian 
Federation (43.3 tcm), followed by Iran and Qatar with 29.6 and 25.5 tcm, 
respectively. These three countries alone account for 53.2% of global proven gas 
reserves of 185 tcm. In production, Russia again has the largest share with 602 bcm 
gas production in 2008, closely followed by US with 582 bcm. The top 5 gas 
producers account for 51.6% of world production. On consumption side, again US 
and Russia have the leading figures and are responsible for 35.9% of total gas 
consumption. However, it is important to note that although US and Russia dominate 
both production and consumption, international gas market is dominated by Russia 
only as US consumes more gas than it produces while Russia exports about 30% of 
its gas.
5EU27 has only 2.87% of proved world gas reserves and is responsible for 6.2% of 
world production while it consumes about 16.2% of the gas produced in the world. 
Historically, gas consumption of EU27 has been rising from 39.3 bcm in 1965 to 
490.1 bcm in 2008, corresponding to an annual growth rate of 6.33%. Indigenous 
production covered 39% of the demand in 2008, mainly from the UK (69.6 bcm) and
the Netherlands (67.5 bcm). In 2008, with gas exports of 115 bcm to EU, Russia was 
by far the largest gas supplier for EU. Second major supplier was Norway with 
exports of 85 bcm, followed by Algeria with 49 bcm. In 2008, these three countries 
provided 51% of total gas consumed in EU and dependence of EU on imported gas 
was 64% in total. So, it is obvious that EU is highly dependent on gas imports and 
especially those from Russia (23% of total demand), Norway (17% of total demand)
and Algeria (10% of total demand). Table 4 shows EU gas trade in 2008 [4].
[Table 4 goes here]
UK, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, France and Spain are the major natural gas 
markets with considerably high amounts of consumption above 35 bcm per year, as 
shown in Table 5. Belgium, Poland, Romania and Hungary are medium size markets 
with a consumption of between 12-18 bcm. The annual consumption of other EU 
members is less than 10 bcm for each but they might constitute coherent regional 
markets comprised of two or more relevant countries. The import dependency for 
natural gas was 60% in 2008 for EU as a whole. The dependency on imports from 
abroad, however, differs significantly between countries. 22 member countries of the 
EU27 import more than 80% of their gas consumption and 11 of them are totally 
dependent on imported gas.
6[Table 5 goes here]
Actually, the doubts on import dependence are not related to current figures but 
rather arise from the forecasts showing that natural gas imports will increase in the 
forthcoming years. Projections on EU energy demand indicate that natural gas will 
attain the most significant share in the near future. Natural gas consumption in EU 
member states is expected to increase from 533 bcm in 2008 to 753 bcm in 2030, 
corresponding to an increase of 41% [2]. Moreover, it is also expected that gas 
production in Germany, Italy and UK will decline substantially over the next two 
decades. The fall in natural gas production within the EU is expected to further 
enhance the supply gap over the coming decades, although high gas prices may 
extend reserves slightly and thus prolong production. So, it is obvious that EU gas
import needs will increase considerably driven by a combination of rapid increase in 
demand and declining production. As a result there will be an increased import 
dependency which will affect security of gas supply, not only in the gas sector but 
also in the electricity sector. Gas demand will partially depend on the level of 
continued CO2 emission restrictions and a possible nuclear phase-out in the UK. 
Projections show that natural gas will meet 30.1% of total primary energy demand in 
2030 and EU27 import dependency will be 74% [2].
At present, known natural gas reserves available for gas supply to EU are in four 
main locations: the Russian basin, Middle East basin, North Sea basin and 
Mediterranean basin. Since EU has already exploited the last two basins in a greater 
extent, it will focus more on the first two in the near future to meet its increasing 
demand. Pipelines through Ukraine have enormous significance for EU gas supply 
with annual capacity of 120 bcm. All Russian gas supplies through Ukraine were 
7shut down early in January 2006 and January 2009 in a further escalation of the 
pricing dispute, leaving some EU countries with no gas supplies from Russia in 
conditions of very cold winter. The reasons for these crises were the combination of 
fundamental changes in Russia, Europe and in the gas business itself. These crises
have caused EU to question its dependence on Russia for gas supplies and EU policy 
shifted towards a policy to construct a pipeline to bring gas from Caspian and Middle 
East basin to EU bypassing Russia. Now, let me focus on this pipeline, namely 
Nabucco.
3. Nabucco project
3.1. Characteristics of the project
The Nabucco project represents a new gas pipeline connecting the Caspian region 
and Middle East (via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary) with Austria and further 
on with the Central and Western European gas markets. The pipeline length is 
approximately 3,300 km (Turkey 2,000 km, Bulgaria 400 km, Romania 460 km, 
Hungary 390 km and Austria 46 km), connecting Georgian/Turkish and
Iranian/Turkish border to Baumgarten in Austria (see Figure 1). The pipeline has 
been designed to transport a maximum amount of 31 bcm/year. Estimated investment 
costs including finance costs amount to approximately 7.9 billion Euro.
[Figure 1 goes here]
The pipeline will be constructed in two major stages - first to construct the complete 
new route from Turkish borders to Baumgarten, and second to construct further 
8compressor stations to increase capacity. The first construction step is split into two 
separate back-to-back construction phases. The first construction phase, starting in 
2011, will cover the planned route between Ankara and Baumgarten, corresponding 
to the construction of approximately 2,000 km of pipeline. After this phase, the 
existing pipeline facilities between the Turkish / Georgian and Iranian borders could 
be used for an interim period of 2 years, in order to link the new pipeline to the 
Turkish borders. This will enable the project to start operation and first gas will flow 
in 2014 with an initial pipeline capacity up to 8 bcm, while the construction of the 
rest of the pipeline will be finished in parallel. The second construction phase will 
run from 2014 until end 2015 and will consist of the construction of the remaining 
section between the Turkish border to Georgia and Iran. The second construction 
step will consist of installation of further compression stations at key points of the 
pipeline in order to continuously increase the pipeline capacity up to 31 bcm/year 
[5].
OMV (Austria), MOL (Hungary), Transgaz (Romania), BEH (Bulgaria), BOTAS 
(Turkey) and RWE (Germany) are shareholders in Nabucco Gas Pipeline and each 
holds an equal share of 16.67% in the project company. The project contemplates 
that 50% of the pipeline capacity will be reserved for shareholders, with the 
remaining 50% available to other gas shippers on commercial terms to be agreed. 
The tender process to allocate capacity is called “open season” and consists of two 
steps. In the first step, the offer is addressed to the shareholders for an amount up to 
15 bcm - fifty percent of Nabucco’s maximum transport capacity. In the second step, 
Nabucco will offer the other 50 percent to external companies. In this procedure all 
market participants will have equal opportunity to secure long-term contracts. Open 
season will start in 2010. The entire process will last around six months.
93.2. Historical background
First talks about the project took place in February 2002 between OMV and Botas, 
later on MOL, Transgaz, BEH followed. Following a Memorandum of Cooperation 
in May 2002 between BOTAS and OMV, in a meeting in June 2002 in Istanbul, all 
five parties to the project signed a protocol on their intention to jointly construct a 
new gas pipeline crossing Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary and connecting 
the significant Middle East and Caspian gas reserves with Austria and even further 
with the Central and Western European gas markets. In October 2002, a Cooperation 
Agreement was signed between Botas, BEH, MOL, Transgaz and OMV whose main 
goal was to conduct a feasibility study for the construction of the new gas pipeline.
In December 2003, a Grant Agreement was signed between OMV Gas, the other four 
partners as associated beneficiaries and the European Commission. With this 
agreement the EU awarded a grant in the amount of 50% of the estimated total costs 
of the study phase i.e. feasibility study including market analysis, technical, 
economic and financial studies. The Joint Venture Agreement was signed by the 
Nabucco partners on June 28th, 2005. The Joint Venture Agreement sets out the rules 
of the Nabucco Partners’ participation in Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH 
(NGPI) and the Nabucco National Companies. In February 2008, RWE (Germany) 
became 6th Shareholder in the project. The Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) was 
signed in Ankara on July 13th, 2009. It is a political agreement between the 
governments of the Nabucco transit countries, namely Austria, Hungary, Romania, 
Bulgaria and Turkey. With this treaty an important milestone was achieved as it 
harmonizes the legal framework and grants stable and equal transport conditions for 
all partners and customers. Although there is still no guarantee that a final investment 
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decision (FID) will be made and that the pipeline will ever be built, with the 
intergovernmental agreement signed, the project’s chances of being completed have 
improved to a large extent. With the agreement in place, Nabucco can proceed with 
signing project-support agreements with each of the five host countries, 
commissioning detailed engineering work, and launching open season for capacity 
allocations.
3.3. Strengths of the project
The original impetus for the project was just business. The Turks and Austrians saw 
it as a way to get new supplies of gas from the Caspian and Middle East, not to 
mention lucrative transit fees for moving it across their territories into Europe. But 
politics soon entered into it, as Nabucco won early moral support from Russia 
skeptics in Central and Eastern Europe. They saw the pipeline as a historic 
opportunity to build a new lifeline to the West while weakening Russia’s grip on 
them [1]. So, the most important strength of the Nabucco project originates in the 
fact that gas demand in EU extensively increases while production declines and EU 
therefore aims at having new gas sources without increasing its already high 
dependence on Russia. The Nabucco project is the principal project capable of 
delivering an answer to this question. So the fundamental principles that precipitated 
Nabucco in the first place not only remain but are set to become all the more 
pertinent in the near future. EU’s gas supply needs to increase by around 40% over 
the next two decades if it is to keep pace with demand. 
As the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) begins to take effect, coal-fired 
generation plants will become extremely expensive to run on account of the high 
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levels of CO2 they emit. By comparison, gas plants produce relatively low quantities 
of greenhouse gases. As such, the vast majority of EU growth in generation capacity 
is expected to come from natural gas. EU countries will not only face the task of 
increasing their capacity but they also will need to replace existing plants with 
cleaner ones if they are to remain within the limits imposed by EU ETS. As the cost 
of carbon increases, the demand for gas will grow even faster. Concurrently, as the
value of gas grows, the Nabucco project becomes economically viable. Thus, as 
carbon prices are expected to go upwards, the interest in Nabucco becomes greater, 
which constitutes the second most important strength of the project.
The undisguised hostility of Russia to the Nabucco project and the fears expressed by 
EU about a Russian-led “gas cartel” may, perversely, work in favor of the Nabucco 
pipeline, persuading its sponsors that despite its acknowledged risks, going ahead 
with the new pipeline would be better than the alternative of being stuck with their 
current suppliers, mainly from Russia.
Two other developments in 2008 also strengthened Nabucco project. First, 
substantial gas reserves were discovered in Turkmenistan. This partly addresses the 
question where the gas would come from (given on-going instability in Iran and 
Iraq), which had been one of the pipeline’s critical weak spots. The second 
development was political. The governments in Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have 
come out in favor of the pipeline and rejected Russian approaches to purchase all of 
their reserves (even at European prices).
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3.4. Main drawbacks
Nabucco is by no means guaranteed. Long-standing obstacles remain. First of all, it 
is not clear where the gas needed to fill the pipeline would come from. Russia has 
signed contracts to acquire most of the gas exported by the Caspian states, while the 
political situation in Iran and Iraq currently precludes the possibility of transporting 
gas from or through those countries. For Nabucco to be initially viable, the gas will 
need to come from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz 2 field. In fact, without Azerbaijan and 
its major natural gas supplies, Nabucco is a non-starter. However, Nabucco needs 
additional suppliers because Azerbaijan can supply only half of the amount needed 
for its feasibility. Turkmenistan and Iran hold an estimated 7.94 tcm and 29.61 tcm 
proven natural gas reserves, respectively [3] and have the potential to supply gas to 
planned Nabucco pipeline. Until recently, both of these states were considered too 
unstable or hostile to be willing to sell gas to EU. However, Turkmenistan is 
showing signs of commitment to supply the pipeline, and although improved 
Western-Iranian relations are not on the horizon, Iran should be considered a viable 
supply solution in the long run. So, Nabucco project desperately needs gas from 
these two countries to remain feasible. Without the involvement of Iran and 
Turkmenistan, the Nabucco project would be curtailed. At this point, it is also 
problematic to have access to Iranian or Turkmenistan gas. Iran has to develop its 
pipeline network in the country’s north to make deliveries via Nabucco, which 
requires major investments.
Second main obstacle to the project comes from Russian antagonism. Russia has 
been employed and will continue to employ divide and rule tactics through 
invitations to Nabucco’s allies to participate in rival pipeline South Stream project.
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What's more, in May 2007, Gazprom succeeded in recreating a strong alliance with 
the gas producers of Central Asia and bounded them to sell major shares of their gas 
to Gazprom and to install a large pipeline of 80 bcm/year to Russia along the Caspian 
Sea [6].
The third problem relates to the issues about financing the project. Indeed given the 
scale of the problems in securing guaranteed supplies of gas for the project, it 
remains doubtful whether Nabucco will ever be able to secure the necessary 
financing it requires to go ahead as a purely commercial project, with commercial 
loans backed by guaranteed income from future gas sales. Without sufficiently long-
term binding gas through-put commitments, the project is unable to secure the 
necessary finance. On January 27, 2009, at the Nabucco Summit held in Budapest, 
the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) committed to provide financial backing for the Nabucco gas 
pipeline. However, this “commitment” was conditioned on the project meeting “the 
requirements of solid project financing”. Without dedicated gas supplies, and the 
associated cash-flows, Nabucco may be unable to complete any project financing.
Although these tentative commitments from EIB and EBRD, the bulk of the 
financing will have to come from private sources, at a time when companies are 
facing severely restricted access to global capital markets.
Soaring construction costs and vast number of parties involved are other problems 
with Nabucco project. Project costs have soared from 5 billion Euro in 2005 to nearly 
8 billion Euro at the end of 2009. The project has also suffered from repeated delays 
(construction is now expected to begin in 2010, at the earliest) and the vast number 
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of governments and parties involved makes drafting a contract that satisfies all 
parties a legal and diplomatic nightmare.
The fifth setback relates to investment risks and such risks are not confined to Iraq. 
The inherent instability of the region between the south Caspian and eastern Turkey 
offers a potential threat against all Nabucco’s potential suppliers. Indeed the past two 
years have seen several attacks by Kurdish separatists on gas and oil lines both in 
Turkey and in northern Iran, while both Georgia and Azerbaijan have also to contend 
with their own serious security problems, which may yet persuade investors that 
investment in Nabucco is too risky to pursue.
Other problems occur from Turkish demands. Turkey sought to link approval for 
Nabucco to the opening of the energy chapter in its EU accession talks, which has 
been blocked by Cyprus. Besides, contrary to agreement that the Vienna based 
Nabucco consortium would pay taxes only to Austria, Turkey also wanted to 
guarantee a sort of tax imposed by transit countries on transit gas calculated in terms 
of the distance that the pipeline passed through the passage country. The most 
contentious issue, however, had been a long-running demand by Turkey for it to take 
15% of the supply for its own needs at discounted prices. The other Nabucco 
consortium members opposed this. Turkey will instead be allocated a share of the 
50% of supply that consortium members can take (the remaining 50% of capacity 
will be offered to third-party shippers). In return for this concession, Turkey will 
receive up to 60% of the tax revenues from Nabucco, which is estimated worth up to 
450 million Euro a year.
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3.5. Its chief rival: South Stream pipeline project
In response to the gas pipeline project that will bypass Russia, Gazprom started a 
counter work to create a new transport corridor, named South Stream. This project 
will be a system of gas pipelines linking Russia and Southeastern Europe and Italy 
via the bottom of Black Sea. Figure 2 shows the route of South Stream project while 
Table 6 compares it with Nabucco.
[Figure 2 goes here]
[Table 6 goes here]
South Stream project is planned to have an annual capacity of 63 bcm and the cost is 
estimated at around 19-24 billion Euro. South Stream pipeline, covering 3200 km, of 
which 900 km are routed under the Black Sea, would enable to connect Russia to 
Bulgaria via the Black Sea by 2015. From that point, it would divide into two 
branches, one would go to Austria and the other to Italy [7]. 
On June 23, 2007, Gazprom (Russia) and Eni (Italy) signed a memorandum to 
construct the South Stream pipeline, transporting gas from Russia’s Black Sea to 
Bulgaria and then to central Europe. The South Stream pipeline, which competes 
directly with the Nabucco project, is a 50-50 joint venture between Gazprom and 
Eni, Gazprom’s single largest customer. Moreover, Russia signed intergovernmental 
agreements for the project with Serbia (January 25, 2006), Bulgaria (January 18, 
2008), Hungary (February 28, 2008), Greece (April 29, 2008) and Slovenia 
(November 14, 2009). At present, negotiations are underway to sign a similar
agreement with Austria. So far, Russia has not received the consent of Romania and 
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Ukraine to the offshore pipeline sections passing through their economic zones. This 
may have a negative impact on the project.
To undermine Nabucco, Gazprom also signed gas purchase agreements with Central 
Asian countries in late 2007, conceding substantial price increases (up to $150/1000 
cubic meter) in exchange for control of most of the gas volumes they export [8].
4. Policies on Nabucco project
4.1. Policy of the European Union
EU has agreed on its energy plan based on sustainability, competitiveness and 
security of supply. This plan, as indicated by the Second Strategic Energy Review, 
necessitates reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, increasing the share of 
renewables in the energy consumption to 20% and improving energy efficiency by 
20%, all of it by 2020 [9]. This agenda attributes a special significance to natural gas 
which is expected to grow in consumption and contribute to the targets set for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
Within this context, EU has finally signaled its willingness to fund Nabucco project. 
At a summit in Brussels, EU leaders gave final approval to a 200 million Euro grant 
towards the construction costs but made it clear that it does not intend to increase its 
contribution. EU may offer loans and guarantees, but it has no intention to provide 
capital financing as this turns the project into a public-private partnership. The EU’s 
position with regards to Nabucco is weakened by differing levels of support for the 
project among its members, and more broadly, the absence of a coherent energy 
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policy. For instance, in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis at the beginning of 
2009, Eastern European governments reiterated their support for Nabucco pipeline at 
a meeting in Budapest in January 2009. In response to Eastern Europe’s pledged 
support, Germany and Italy moved against the project on the grounds that the 
construction of Nabucco is unlikely to begin for many years. However, in reality, 
truth is that neither Germany nor Italy is keen to invest in energy diversification 
projects, having secured bilateral energy treaties with Russia. Similarly, France, with 
its nicely diversified supply of energy, has little appetite for changing the status quo 
and is far less willing to antagonize Moscow by bringing non-Russian gas into 
Europe through former Soviet satellites. Indeed, these positions reflect the most 
substantial threat to Nabucco; namely, the lack of political will in European capitals. 
Germany, Italy and even member states of the Nabucco consortium have all entered 
into bilateral agreements with Russia, seemingly undermining the project. Together, 
these countries have blocked any effort within EU to allocate funding for Nabucco or 
even make support for the pipeline a common policy. 
4.2. Russian policy
With its rich proven reserves ranking 1st in the world, geographic location, rapidly 
developing pipeline systems, technical skills and know-how, Russia is the most 
important energy partner of the EU and ready to do what is necessary to keep its 
current position. Russia’s monopolistic strategy with a mix of geopolitical and 
commercial interests has been most visible in its efforts to undermine a common EU 
energy policy. Russia tries in particular to undermine the Nabucco-gas pipeline with 
a rival pipeline (South Stream) notwithstanding the fact that it will cost at least twice 
as much as Nabucco does. It has also sought to strengthen its gas pipeline monopoly 
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not only from Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan) but also from all 
other real and potential gas suppliers to the EU member states (such as Iran, Qatar 
and North-African states) by offering to buy all their gas for exports to EU. 
Gazprom’s activities in Middle East and North Africa as well as Russia’s willingness 
to increase Gazprom’s market share in EU market implies that Russia is in search of 
a “gas containment policy”. Current aggressive Russian policy towards Nabucco 
seems to be just a part of this containment policy.
In brief, Russia uses all available means to prevent the Nabucco project. It 
manipulates politicians and resorts to old-fashioned bullying, especially in the states 
that Nabucco transits. It also acquires stakes in European energy companies that 
could complicate Nabucco’s completion and tries to buy up natural gas in Central 
Asia and the Caspian, even paying up to four times more than in previous years, to 
deny supplies to Nabucco. Along with all these it proposes a rival pipeline that costs 
twice more than Nabucco.
If there is still any doubt about how far Russia would go to fight for its interests in 
global gas market, one should look at Georgia, which is still in the recovery process 
after Russia’s invasion last summer. Georgia is the key transit state hosting two 
pipelines that bring oil and gas from the Caspian to Turkey. By attacking its small 
neighbor, Russia effectively warned not only Georgia but the whole neighborhood.
4.3. Turkish policy
Turkish policy on Nabucco has been quite inconsistent from the beginning. On the 
one hand, Turkey genuinely supports Nabucco project as it not only strengthens its 
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geopolitical importance and provides huge transit revenues but also improves its 
position as an energy corridor that bridges Caspian region and Middle East to 
Europe. On the other hand, Turkey has until now been seen as an obstacle because as 
a principle it insists on the right to consume 15% of the gas from any pipeline built 
on its territory, to be purchased at a “reasonable price”. There has also been a 
suggestion that the Turkey wanted to tax gas in transit and play the role of a 
middleman in the Caspian/EU gas trade, rather than being a transit state. Further 
complicating the situation, Turkey sought to link approval for Nabucco to the 
opening of the energy chapter in its EU accession talks, which has been blocked by 
Cyprus.
Before Nabucco project, Turkey had a weak position. It had been declined many 
times for EU membership and depended on Russia for a majority of its natural gas. 
But now, with the country’s gas demand skyrocketing and Turkish supply contracts 
with Russia set to expire, Turkey, on whose land about 60% of the pipeline will lie, 
seems to try to take advantage of Nabucco project and use its geographic position to 
meet its gas demand at low prices and get a short-cut to EU membership.
Turkey is also prone to use its Nabucco card in other political issues. For instance, 
when EU asked the Nabucco consortium to bring in a European gas major as a sixth 
partner to increase not only political and business support for the project but also its 
feasibility, Botas (Turkey) declared it was breaking off talks with Gaz de France to 
fill that role because of Turkey’s political problems with France.
Nabucco project also faces another challenge from Turkey as it looks to buy up all 
the available gas from Azerbaijan, the only country that looks most likely to supply 
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the line in the first years of the project. Today, there is little wonder that Turkey’s 
first priority is to ensure that its gas needs are met, ahead of his commitments to 
Nabucco. 
4.4. Azeri, Turkmen and Iranian policies
Before it gets cash, Nabucco needs to secure adequate supplies of gas. Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan and Iran are three potential gas suppliers for Nabucco project with 
large proven reserves.
Azerbaijan is being regarded as the main source for the initial stages of the project
with supplies to come from the second development phase of the country’s offshore 
Shah Deniz gas field. Azerbaijan has affirmed its desire to supply gas but has 
acknowledged that its resources are insufficient to fill the pipeline in the longer term. 
Actually, Azerbaijan’s support for Nabucco arises mainly from a desire to reinforce 
its ties with the West. The short war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 has 
drastically improved Azerbaijan’s perception of the value of Western support in the 
event of a crisis. Also, Russia’s decision in August 2008 to close for several hours 
for maintenance Azerbaijan’s only oil export pipeline that crosses Russian territory 
was seen in Azerbaijan as a direct Russian threat. Besides, Russia’s approach to 
Ukraine in January 2009 caused alarm as it was perceived to demonstrate that Russia 
was prepared to hurt its own commercial interests in order to punish a neighbor. 
Recently, Nabucco’s supporters in EU have started to get their acts together and 
Azerbaijan has begun to take notice of that, too. In May 2009, the EU signed a deal 
with Azerbaijan, which committed to building energy and trade links directly with 
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EU. This was arguably a more valuable agreement than the one Azerbaijan later 
signed with Gazprom, which offered not money but only vague pledges that may or 
may not be met. Moscow has offered and will keep offering to buy all Azeri gas 
output at world prices. Although this is an extremely attractive offer for Azerbaijan, 
which has long sold gas to Turkey and Georgia at prices far below the world rate; 
Azerbaijan continues to turn Russia down because it aims to move away from Russia 
in order to diversify its export outlets. However, if Azerbaijan accepts Russian offer 
one day, it effectively turns Nabucco into a pipedream. 
At present, Turkmenistan does not really have much choice as it is a landlocked 
country and can only evacuate its gas via Russia. By promising increasingly 
remunerative prices and by signing long-term supply contracts, Russia tries to 
undermine gas pipeline projects (like Nabucco), which could be used for evacuating 
Turkmen gas via other routes. However, Turkmenistan wants to supply Nabucco 
pipeline for three reasons. First of all, Nabucco provides an alternative to reduce its 
dependence on Russian pipelines. Second, Nabucco is the shortest route from 
Turkmenistan to the EU. Third, EU will continue to pay the highest prices, making it 
the most attractive gas market for Turkmenistan.
Of the potential suppliers, Iran seems to be the best position as it has been exporting 
gas to Turkey since 2001. But recent events have cast doubt on Iran’s status as prime 
supplier for Nabucco. Iran’s frequent suspensions of gas supplies to Turkey citing 
“technical problems” due to cold weather have raised questions about the country’s 
willingness to offer security of supply. This has not been lost on the Nabucco 
partners, who have emphasized that the project could go ahead without Iranian gas. 
Moreover, its alleged nuclear weapons program is another obstacle to Iran’s status as 
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a gas supplier to Nabucco.  It is almost impossible to include Iran into project until 
the dispute is resolved. Even if that happens soon, there are grounds to doubt whether 
Iran could deliver within a timeframe acceptable to the EU. Iranian gas production 
has remained constant for years; currently, most of the country’s output is used for 
reinjection in the country’s oil fields. Given the required level of investment in Iran, 
as well as a change in its international relations, the prospects of sizeable Iranian 
volumes entering Nabucco by 2020 are extremely weak.
4.5. Hungarian policy
Hungary has interests in both Nabucco and South Stream projects. From Hungary’s 
point of view, South Stream arguably has more to offer. Nabucco has so far been 
seen as a straight gas transit proposition for MOL, the national oil and gas company. 
But in conjunction with South Stream, MOL expects to build some 10 bcm of 
underground gas storage, which would be a major source of revenue and turn 
Hungary into a Gazprom “hub” for supplies to western Europe. Hungary will not 
only receive tax revenue from these sites but also get considerable energy security 
from the fact that its storage facilities add up to nearly 100% of the country’s total 
annual gas consumption. For these reasons, it has recently been concerned that 
Hungary may turn to South Stream and withdraw its support from Nabucco project, 
which jeopardizes the future of the Nabucco. These concerns are worrying to both 
the project’s sponsors and the EU, especially given Hungary’s already strong 
relationship with Russia.
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5. Analysis of the policies
In many respects, EU gas market is a captive one that is largely dependent on 
pipeline supply from Russia (whether Russian gas or gas from upstream countries 
that use Russian transit pipelines) especially to meet peak winter demand. Given the 
projected increase in EU demand for natural gas, its declining gas reserves, and the 
planned construction of the North European Gas Pipeline, which will directly 
connect Russia’s pipeline system with the European gas grid, EU will be even more 
dependent on Russian gas supplies in coming years. 
When a captive market is dependent on supply from another region within the same 
country, the captive market often relies on regulation from the central government to 
protect it. There is no central government to protect EU from Russian market power. 
Under these conditions, the best protection against market power is the development 
of competitive alternatives. Even no regulatory regime can check the market power 
of a gas supplier as effectively as competitive pressure [10]. Therefore, the best 
policy for EU seems to be supporting Nabucco project to break monopoly power of 
Russia in EU gas market. 
The risk associated with relying on Russian gas and Ukrainian transit routes is not 
the only threat to European gas supply security. A chronic lack of investment in 
Russia’s gas constitutes another source of risk. Russia relies on Europe for security 
of demand, but mismanagement of the industry means that Russia may not be in a 
position to meet EU demand by 2020. This fact contributes to reasons why Nabucco 
is indispensable for the EU. Nabucco may not only effectively break Russia’s 
stronghold on gas exports to Europe by importing gas from the Caspian and Middle 
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East without crossing Russian soil but also provide an additional route of gas supply 
to meet EU demand. Potentially, Nabucco can supply 5-10% of EU gas demand and 
will provide immediate tangible security-of-supply benefits if operationalized.
Under these circumstances, EU leaders are expected to accept that Nabucco project is 
fundamentally a political one requiring EU funding and to agree to provide a share of 
the finance. Unless EU leaders are prepared to support the project financially, there is 
little prospect of the potential suppliers publicly committing themselves to Nabucco. 
And without guaranteed suppliers, financial backing will not be forthcoming. Direct 
financial support to Nabucco from the EU is a move that requires a major shift in 
current EU energy policy but it is also one to which the EU increasing appears to 
have no alternative.
Traditionally, energy policy has been seen as a domestic matter in EU, not a 
European issue. However, the present situation, where each member country tends to 
have its own energy policy separately, is simply unsustainable. EU members have to 
recognize that energy in general and natural gas supply security in particular are now 
EU issues and realize that each member country can no longer, by itself, deal with 
the energy challenges that face EU. Member states have to work together, if they are 
to implement ambitious targets concerned with improving energy security. Actually, 
there is nothing new about fact that Europe’s difficulty in securing energy supplies 
derives from self-inflicted division. However, this has to change as the present 
situation is no longer sustainable. For Europe not to have a common energy policy 
means EU does not have control of its energy destiny. Furthermore, the suggestion 
that a common energy policy emerging from coordinated member states would 
reduce dependency is erroneous and marks a deeper misunderstanding perpetuated in 
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EU documents. To realize its targets, a coordinated policy is not sufficient for EU, 
which needs a united one. Today, even if armed with supranational powers, the EU 
could not negotiate gas supply contracts with suppliers on behalf of its member states 
and cannot itself conclude contracts as a single, importing entity. In the absence of 
this specific competence, the aim of coordinating currently uncoordinated gas supply 
policies of its member states with the goal of “speaking with one voice” is 
excessively ambitious at best and unachievable at worst. All EU member states 
should recognize the fact that the most important aim of any monopoly is to extract 
monopoly rent from its customers and Russia is not an exception. Its current policy 
of “divide-and-rule” may require it behave nicely towards some EU countries 
(especially Germany and Italy) but sooner or later EU as a whole will have to pay 
price of depending heavily on Russian supplies and pipelines.
Without an alternative gas delivery infrastructure capacity, EU will be at the mercy 
of a Russian decision to halt supplies. One need not look any further than Russia’s 
decision to temporarily cut supplies first in January 2006 and then in January 2009 to 
the Ukraine, a country that transports roughly 80% of the Russian gas destined for 
EU markets, to see this. To reduce reliance on pipeline supply from Russia and the 
countries that will deliver gas through the Russian pipeline network, EU must 
develop new gas delivery infrastructure that can access other gas supplies. With new 
delivery infrastructure in place, EU need not curtail deliveries of gas from Russia. 
EU needs only to diversify its supply sources and have in place a degree of redundant 
capacity to mitigate the risk of curtailment from any one source, enhancing energy 
security.
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The idea that Russia is going to stand by and watch very large pipelines being built 
to carry gas from Caspian and Middle East regions to Europe and have no influence 
and no say in their building is probably naive. Unlike EU, Russia acts according to 
what it regards as its best interest. Gazprom is doing everything possible to “shoot 
down” the Nabucco project. Russia has taken the initiative to sign long-term supply 
agreements in Caspian countries with significant gas reserves and therefore today no 
one is sure which gas will be conveyed via the “Nabucco” network. Also, Russia has 
many times proved that it is ready to use physical force to protect its interests in gas 
market.
In this opera, Turkey has been cast in one of the leading roles. With its indispensable 
geographic position between the oil and gas reserves of Iraq, Iran, and the Caspian, it 
is an absolute certainty that Turkey will host major pipelines sooner or later. If 
Nabucco succeeds, Turkey will be one of the biggest winners both economically and 
geopolitically. However, Turkey’s opportunistic policy so far seems to undermine 
the project. Ankara’s willingness to “play the energy card” in all occasions poses two 
deep questions for EU. First, will Turkey follow Ukraine’s example and become 
more bullish in exacting transit fees? If so, this could prove an even bigger obstacle 
to Nabucco’s eventual realization than securing upstream reserves. Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, does shifting dependence from Russia and Ukraine to 
Caspian region and Turkey necessarily improve security of supply? Today, 
Nabucco’s gas needs appear increasingly to be in conflict with those of Turkey, 
which also aims at finding new sources of gas both to meet increasing demand and to 
reduce dependence on Russia. However, if Nabucco fails, Turkey will be even more 
dependent on Russia and will lose billions of dollars of transit revenues, let alone 
employment opportunities created by constructing 2,000 km pipeline on its soils. So, 
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Turkey needs to focus more on its long term interests (rather than short term 
opportunistic maneuvers) while determining its policy on Nabucco.
It is obvious that, initially, Nabucco will rely on Azerbaijan’s massive Shah Deniz 2 
gas field. This is a realistic source for EU gas deliveries, but the EU wants the gas by 
2012. While Nabucco’s planned capacity is 31 bcm/year, start-up volumes could be 
as little as 10 bcm/year. Nabucco expects that Shah Deniz 2 field will supply 8 bcm 
annually when it comes on stream in 2013. However, this volume is not sufficient to 
make project feasible from an economic point of view. Iran may also be seen as a 
potential supplier, but this is impossible until the dispute surrounding its alleged 
nuclear weapons program is resolved. And even then, there is no certainty that Iran 
could deliver within a timeframe acceptable to the EU. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 
Iraq and even Russia have been listed as other possible supply sources for the 
Nabucco pipeline, but there are risks associated with all of these potential supply 
sources. So far, no guarantees have been given to fill the pipeline with real gas 
volumes.
6. Conclusion
Faced with a serious challenge in the form of Russian backed South Stream pipeline, 
the Nabucco project continues to have difficulty finding enough gas to make the line 
viable. However, no-one has ever claimed that Nabucco would be an easy project to 
realize. Putting together a purely commercial project bringing gas 3,300 km across 
Turkey to central Europe was a tough call. So far, no single pipeline project that 
sources gas from a portfolio of suppliers, requires multiple transit agreements and 
supplies an equally diverse portfolio of customers has been realized.
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For EU, the Nabucco line offers a valuable alternative source of supply to Russia, 
whose increasing control over gas exports into Europe has become a significant 
concern for the EU. In the end, the Nabucco pipeline will probably be built not only 
because the EU and the US are putting their political weight behind the project but 
also because the gap between EU gas demand and supply is set to rise sharply in the 
coming decade. In reality, South Stream and Nabucco are neither competitors nor 
mutually exclusive pipeline projects. Projections show that Europe will need more 
additional gas than the combined capacities of both projects. EU gas market is large 
enough to accommodate many such projects and the associated gas volumes. Even if 
built and fully charged together, two projects only supply 15-20% of EU 
consumption. Actually, demand for gas from Nabucco far outstrips its capacity. If 
realized, it is obvious that Nabucco will be two to three times overbooked. However, 
all these do not mean that Russia will stop undermining Nabucco. It will continue to 
do so as its main concern is not EU gas security but preserving its position as a 
monopoly in EU and a monopson in Central Asia. 
Within this context, the fate of Nabucco depends largely on whether or not EU 
members and other actors (Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran and so on) are 
ready to act based on their long term interests. The history has shown that power 
corrupts and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely. Unless curtailed, sooner or 
later, all actors will suffer from Russian monopoly power either in the form of 
excessively high gas prices or in the form of supply interruptions.
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Table 1. Proved natural gas reserves (trillion cubic meters)
Countries 1988 1998 2008 Share of total
1.Russian Federation n/a 43.51 43.30 23.4%
2. Iran 14.20 24.10 29.61 16.0%
3.Qatar 4.62 10.90 25.46 13.8%
4.Turkmenistan n/a 2.51 7.94 4.3%
5.Saudi Arabia 5.02 6.07 7.57 4.1%
6.US 4.76 4.65 6.73 3.6%
7.United Arab Emirates 5.66 6.00 6.43 3.5%
8.Nigeria 2.48 3.51 5.22 2.8%
9.Venezuela 2.86 4.15 4.84 2.6%
10.Algeria 3.23 4.08 4.50 2.4%
11. Indonesia 2.56 2.18 3.18 1.7%
12. Iraq 2.69 3.19 3.17 1.7%
13.Norway 2.30 3.79 2.91 1.6%
14.Australia 1.11 1.65 2.51 1.4%
15.China 0.92 1.37 2.46 1.3%
16.Malaysia 1.49 2.41 2.39 1.3%
17.Egypt 0.33 1.02 2.17 1.2%
18.Kazakhstan n/a 1.81 1.82 1.0%
19.Kuwait 1.38 1.48 1.78 1.0%
20.Canada 2.67 1.75 1.63 0.9%
Total World 109.72 148.01 185.02 100.0%
of which: European Union 3.65 3.77 2.87 1.6%
Table 2. Natural gas production in 2008 (billion cubic meters)
Countries Production Share of total
1. Russian Federation 601.7 19.6%
2. US 582.2 19.3%
3. Canada 175.2 5.7%
4. Iran 116.3 3.8%
5. Norway 99.2 3.2%
6. Algeria 86.5 2.8%
7. Saudi Arabia 78.1 2.5%
8. Qatar 76.6 2.5%
9. China 76.1 2.5%
10. Indonesia 69.7 2.3%
11. United Kingdom 69.6 2.3%
12. Netherlands 67.5 2.2%
13. Turkmenistan 66.1 2.1%
14. Malaysia 62.5 2.0%
15. Uzbekistan 62.2 2.0%
16. Egypt 58.9 1.9%
17. Mexico 54.9 1.8%
18. United Arab Emirates 50.2 1.6%
19. Argentina 44.1 1.4%
20. Trinidad & Tobago 39.3 1.3%
Total World 3065.6 100.0%
of which: European Union 190.3 6.2%
Table 3. Natural gas consumption in 2008 (billion cubic meters)
Countries Consumption Share of total
1. US 657.2 22.0%
2. Russian Federation 420.2 13.9%
3. Iran 117.6 3.9%
4. Canada 100.0 3.3%
5. United Kingdom 93.9 3.1%
6. Japan 93.7 3.1%
7. Germany 82.0 2.7%
8. China 80.7 2.7%
9. Saudi Arabia 78.1 2.6%
10. Italy 77.7 2.6%
11. Mexico 67.2 2.2%
12. Ukraine 59.7 2.0%
13. United Arab Emirates 58.1 1.9%
14. Uzbekistan 48.7 1.6%
15. Argentina 44.5 1.5%
16. France 44.2 1.5%
17. India 41.4 1.4%
18. Egypt 40.9 1.3%
19. South Korea 39.7 1.3%
20. Spain 39.0 1.3%
Total World 3018.7 100.0%
of which: European Union 490.1 16.2%









1. Austria 1,341 6,707 2,007 10,055
2. Belgium 7,022 819 5,715 906 2,962 17,424
3. Bulgaria 0
4. Cyprus 0
5. Czech Republic 2,073 7,500 9,573
6. Denmark 0
7. Estonia 0
8. Finland 4,739 4,739
9. France 8,553 14,134 6,482 7,263 8,784 45,216
10. Germany 19,972 27,531 40,735 3,753 91,991
11. Greece 119 2,812 633 641 4,205
12. Hungary 161 8,814 2,493 11,468
13. Ireland 4,798 4,798
14. Italy 9,416 1,165 6,277 22,278 25,992 11,739 76,867
15. Latvia 0
16. Lithuania 0
17. Luxembourg 1,255 1,255
18. Malta 0
19. Netherlands 25,337 25,337
20. Poland 906 7,783 2,513 11,202
21. Portugal 2,036 2,727 4,763
22. Romania 0
23. Slovakia 6,266 6,266
24. Slovenia 49 49
25. Spain 310 2,596 13,105 22,584 38,595
26. Sweden 913 913
27. United Kingdom 8,440 2,219 25,528 287 535 37,009
Total 53,403 5,617 31,179 85,195 115,022 49,316 61,993 401,725
Within EU27 Outside EU27
90,199 311,526







1.Belgium 0 17,424 17,424 100%
2.Estonia 0 889 889 100%
3.Finland 0 4,739 4,739 100%
4.Latvia 0 1,325 1,325 100%
5.Lithuania 0 2,948 2,948 100%
6.Luxembourg 0 1,255 1,255 100%
7.Portugal 0 4,763 4,763 100%
8.Sweden 0 913 913 100%
9.Spain 17 38,595 38,612 100%
10.Slovenia 2 1,000 1,002 100%
11.Greece 14 4,205 4,219 100%
12.Slovak Republic 102 6,080 6,182 98%
13.France 934 43,951 44,885 98%
14.Czech Republic 192 8,605 8,797 98%
15.Bulgaria 207 3,322 3,529 94%
16. Ireland 438 4,798 5,236 92%
17. Italy 9,255 76,657 85,912 89%
18.Germany 16,361 79,306 95,667 83%
19.Austria 1,532 7,267 8,799 83%
20.Hungary 2,643 11,447 14,090 81%
21.Poland 5,719 11,163 16,882 66%
22.Romania 10,791 4,189 14,980 28%
23.United Kingdom 73,385 25,855 99,240 26%
24.Netherlands 84,693 -36,381 48,312 -75%
25.Denmark 10,090 -5,516 4,574 -121%
26.Cyprus 0 0 0 -
27.Malta 0 0 0 -
EU27 Total 216,375 318,799 535,174 60%
Table 6. Nabucco vs. South Stream
Characteristic Nabucco South Stream
Pipeline design capacity 31 bcm/year 63 bcm/year
Estimated cost of the project 8 billion Euro 19-24 billion Euro
Pipeline length 3,300 km 3,200 km 
(900 km under the Black Sea)
Start of active negotiations 2002 2006
Political support from EU and US Yes No
Project company Yes Yes
Ship or pay contracts signed No No
Requirement for additional partner High Low
Opportunity to attract project financing Low High
Investment decision made No No
Possible start time of the construction 2010 2011
Possible construction completion time 2019 2015




Figure 2. The routes of Nabucco and South Stream pipeline projects 
 
 
 
